Hq. 21st Inf. Regt.
282400 Feb 1951
Command Report No. III
From: 312400 January 1951
To: 282400 February 1951
The operations of the 21st Infantry Regiment during February are divided into three phases. 1) The early part of the month, from 1 February until 17 February, found the Regiment in a defensive, blocking position astride the Han River near Yoju, with the 1st and 3d Battalions west of the river and the 2d Battalion east of the Han. Aggressive patrolling was conducted during this period and two strong enemy probing attacks were repelled. 2) A successful limited-objective attack to the bend of the Han near Yangpyong, 18 through 19 February, marked the second phase of the Regimentís activity during February. 3) On 20 February the Regiment was relieved in position and moved administratively to the east of the Han, where it relieved the 8th Cavalry Regiment of 1st Cavalry Division in position, strengthened defenses and patrolled vigorously to probe out enemy dispositions . plans were made to withdraw on Division order to the west bank of the Han, funneling through Chonso-ri in event of attack by superior forces.
DEFENSE ASTRIDE THE HAN
The Regiment took up the mission Of screening the Divisionís right flank with the 1st Battalion closing into an assembly area near CS6935 on 2 February, protecting the artillery there and dispatching patrols which initially made no enemy contact. (See Incl. I, Incl. 2, Annex A). The 1st Battalion was moved, on Division order, early on 3 February, to Pallin, in the vicinity of CS696379, continuing the same mission. Patrols crossed the Han at CS710308 and probed north, drawing small arms fire from Hill 231 vicinity CS719407 and from Hill 231 at CS720309. (See Incl. I, Incl. 3, Annex A).
On 4 February the Regiment, less the 2d Battalion, was ordered to the vicinity of CS6835, there to protect the Divisionís right flank. The 2d Battalion was moved, initially, near Koksu-ri and later took up positions closer to the Han River. (See Incl III, Incl 3).
The 3d Battalion moved on 4 February into positions on the left flank of the 1st Battalion, giving the Regiment a defense generally along the horizontal CS42 Grid Line with its left flank in the vicinity of 05650410 and its right near CS729418. The 3d Battalion was on the left, the 1st in the center and on the right. The 2d Battalion was separated from the rest of the Regiment by the Han River. (See Incl. I, Incl. 4, Annex A) .
Until 5 February, patrols made only slight contact with the enemy, but on that date a patrol from the 1st Battalion received machine gun fire from Hill 142, CS 672446 and observed an estimated 40 enemy in that vicinity. A 3d Battalion patrol brought in a civilian report that some 50 mixed CCF and North Korean troops were moving south in the vicinity of CS635436 at 1100 hours, 5 February. A 2d Battalion patrol drew fire from the railroad embankment near CS717472 and estimated that there were two companies of enemy in that vicinity. The air OP reported enemy on a ridge line in the vicinity of CS672446 - CS641459. (See Incl I, Incl. 5, Annex A) That general area was attacked by air with napalm and rockets. It was estimated that more than a regiment of enemy confronted the 2lst Infantry on 5 February, totalling between 2,000 and 5,000 troops in an area bounded by Hill 42, CS672446, Hill 481, CS644441, Hill 303, CS641 458 and CS670460. The enemy was believed capable, on 5 February, of defending in place on the high ground of Hill 142 and Hill 481 and denying all approaches to the Han River. (See Incl I, Incl 5, Annex As.
All units were warned on 5 February of the possibility of an attack in commemoration of the Chinese New Year. (See Incl III, Incl. 5).
Whether it was in celebration of the Chinese New Year is debatable, but our lines west of the Han were heavily probed early 6 February. "B" Companyís left flank was struck at 0130 hours 6 February by a patrol of unknown strength at CS674424. The enemy used machine guns and small arms. This assault appeared to be the vanguard of a reinforced company of enemy which attacked "B" Companyís left flank at 0205 hours. The Battalionís reserve was committed and the situation cleared in the 1st Battalion sector by 0600 hours. Air strikes were called on the fleeing enemy. Results unknown.
An assault on the 3d Battalion which began at 0145 threatened to be more serious. "L" Company, in position on Hill 296, received mortar and small arms fire initially in an action which increased in intensity as time elapsed, until it was estimated that two reinforced enemy companies were committed against "L" Company. The enemy advanced up a ridge line in the vicinity of CS674427, attacking with automatic weapons, small arms and grenades. (See Incl. I, Incl. 6, Annex A and Incl. III, Incl. 30). "L" Company was pushed off Hill 296 before it was able to counterattack. Two platoons of "K" Company, supported by artillery, mortar and air, counter-attacked and the line was restored by 1500 hours, 6 February. (See Incl. III, Incl. 6 and Incl I, Incl. 6, Annex A).
It was estimated that the reinforced enemy battalion which attacked the 1st and 3d Battalions suffered some 280 killed and 305 wounded. (See Incl. 3, Incl. 6).
Friendly casualties during the action were 49 wounded. (See Incl I, Incl. 6, Annex A).
Friendly air strafed the 1st and 3d Battalions at 1235 hours, 6 February but were called off before any damage was done. (Annex A, Incl. III).
Units were ordered to tie-in solidly for the night of 6-7 February, in anticipation of a renewal of the communist attack. Artillery concentrations were planned and arrangements made for illuminating shells to be fired periodically during the night. (See Incl. III, Incl. 6, and Incl. I, Incl. 6, Annex A).
At 1850 hours on 6 February the enemy struck again at "L" Companyís left flank at CS671425, with an estimated platoon. The 1st Battalion moved its reserve into the gap between battalions in anticipation of a stronger attack, but the 3d Battalion drove off the enemy by 2000 hours. The, 3d Battalion received small arms and mortar fire from 2300 on 6 February until 0130 on 7 February, but no heavy attack materialized. (See Incl. I, Incl. 7, Annex A and Incl. III, Incl. 6).
Division was informed at 1900 hours on 6 February that the situation on our left flank was serious, due to the thin line formed by our troops and the fatigued condition of the men who battled the previous night and during the day to restore the line. (See Incl III, Incl. 6).
Division during the night of 6-7 February attached the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, to the Regiment, and the Battalion was moved immediately into the gap between the 3d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. The battalion of the 5th RCT was in position and digging in by 0600 hours, 7 February. (See Incl. III, Incls. 6 and 7, and Incl. I, Incl. 7, Annex A).
The Regiment on 8 February received word from G-3 that it was the desire of the Commanding General, 8th Army, that "patrols go out as far and deep as the need arises to determine where and in what force the enemy is." (See Incl. III, Incl. 8).
Strong patrols probed deep into enemy territory and on 9 February it was estimated that at least two regiments of the 114th CCF Division, with an estimated strength of 3,000 were located, dug-in between Hills 481 and 142. Another two CCF regiments with between 2,000 and 3,000 men were believed to be assembled generally north of Hill 538 CS742455 on both sides of the Hukchon River.
The enemy was considered capable of defending, in place, denying access to Han River crossing sites until such time as he was ready to assume a general offensive. (See Incl. I, Incl. 9, Annex A).
A platoon-sized patrol from Company E, probing deeply in enemy territory, was ambushed in the vicinity of CS 725460 by an estimated company of enemy. A fire fight followed. Only a few of the platoon members escaped the ambush. Two officers, the platoon leader and the artillery forward observer, 13 enlisted men and five republic of Korea soldiers were either killed or captured. (See Incl I, Incl 9, Annex A and Incl. VII, Incl. 9). Orders received late 9 February from Division G-3 directed patrolling on a 24 hour basis, to ward off surprise attack or envelopment. Patrols were sent out continuously, making contact with the enemy but avoiding serious fire fights. (See Incl. III, Incl. 9).
Forty-four men from the 19th Infantry, former prisoners of the Chinese Communist Army came through "E" Company lines at 0630 hours 10 February, some were wounded and some were suffering from frost bite. They were evacuated through medical channels. Captured at Uijongbu on 1 January, they had been subjected to a Communist Indoctrination Course and then released. (See Incl. III, Incl. 10, and Incl. I, Incl. 10, Annex A).
Night and day patrolling continued with no serious action and no new enemy dispositions being disclosed. On 12 February Division ordered that an outpost be established at Koksu-ri, 03776414. The outpost, of not less than platoon size, was to have transportation, radio and telephone communication. (See Incl. III, Incl. 12).
The Outpost Mission was assigned the 2d Battalion, which complied, setting up two wire circuits and voice radio communication. At 2150 hours, 12 February the outpost at Koksu-ri reported by telephone that it was surrounded by a large number of enemy. During the ensuing conversation the wire was cut. The outpost platoon drifted into 2d Battalion positions in small groups during the night. The platoon leader reported that more than 100 enemy were in and around Koksu-ri. (See Incl. III, Incls. 12 and 13).
Again trying to outpost and patrol Koksu-ri as "the eyes and ears of the Corps right flank" (See Incl. III, Incl. 13), the 2d Battalion sent a patrol on 13 February, and it was repulsed by a numerically superior enemy. (See Incl. I, Incl. 13, Annex A).
Another patrol, supported by tanks, departed at daylight, 14 February. By 1140 hours that patrol was engaged in a firefight, one tank had thrown a track and was under small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. (See Incl. III, Incl. 14).
Upon being informed of the situation, Division G-3 ordered the patrol to break contact. It did so, having to destroy the disabled tank and one jeep to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. The patrol reported an estimated battalion of enemy in Koksu-ri. G-3, upon being informed, said the 5th Cavalry Regiment would move through Koksu-ri from the vicinity of Yoju during the nite.
The 2d Battalion tightened their defensive positions, established a bridgehead formation and with its back to the Han-gang put outposts to the northeast, east and southeast. (See Incl. I, Incl. 14 and 15, Annex A). Nine trucks, all the regiment could spare, stood by each night during this critical period to withdraw the battalion, should an overwhelming attack cause Division to order a withdrawal to positions west of the Han River. (See Incl. I, Incl. 15, Annex A).
Lieutenant Colonel Gines Perez, formerly Commander of the 2d Battalion, assumed command of the regiment on 15 February, succeeding Colonel Richard W. Stephens, who was assigned to GHQ, FEC. Other changes in key personnel placed Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mudgett, Jr., formerly Regimental Executive Officer, in command of the 3d Battalion vice Lieutenant Colonel John McConnell, previously evacuated through medical channels. Lieutenant Colonel William F. Staab, formerly S-3, assumed the duties of Executive Officer, and Major Charles Alkire, Assistant S-3, assumed the duties of 5-3. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd Martin was relieved as Civil Assistance Officer by Major Norman Anderson to assume command of the 2d Battalion. (See Incl. I, Incl. 15, and Incl. I, Incl. 30).
Units were warned, on 15 February, to be more than ever alert because of the situation on the right flank at Koksu-ri. (See Incl. I, Incl. 15, Annex A, and Incl. III, Incl. 15).
Company "B" of the 6th Tank Battalion was attached to the Regiment on 15 February. One platoon was attached to the 2d Battalion, on the right flank. (See Incl. I, Incl. 15).
The 1st Battalion, 5th RCT reverted to its parent unit on 17 February, and the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 21st were assigned wider sectors of responsibility to cover the sector previously held by the element of the 5th RCT. Also on 17 February, the 2d Battalion of the 21st was placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division, pending a limited-objective attack planned for 18 February. Tanks attached to the 2d Battalion were relieved and attached to the 1st Battalion. (See Incls. III, Incl. 6, 16 and 17).
Twenty-four men of the 21st and attached units were killed in action during the defensive and patrolling phase from 1 February through 17 February. Seventy-eight were wounded in action, and one officer and 13 men were reported missing. Two ROK soldiers were killed, nine were wounded and two were missing. One officer, one enlisted man and two ROKís attached from the artillery were also reported MIA.
Non-battle casualties. during the period amounted to 95. Trench foot and frozen limbs took the heaviest toll due to the bitter cold weather.
The Regiment inflicted, on the enemy, casualties amounting to many times those it suffered. (See Incl. I, Incls. 1 through 17).
Orders given the 21st RCT (less the 2d Battalion) by Division called for a limited-objective attack, by phase lines, to the north on 18 February. The final objective was the east - west line of the Han River west of Yangpyong.
Division called for the Regiment to be prepared to establish a line in the most defensible positions south of the Han, to patrol-vigorously forward of that line, to seek out and destroy the enemy, and to locate sites to cross the Han river in its zone.
The 3d Battalion, already on the Regimentís left flank, was assigned a zone of attack on the left and the let Battalion was to attack, with a platoon of tanks from "B" Company, 6th Tank Battalion, attached, on the right. Each assault battalion had attached one platoon of the heavy mortar company. The 52d FA Battalion was in direct support.
The terrain over which the attack was to be launched was extremely rugged, being a hill mass between 500 and 600 meters high known as Yanja San.
To facilitate supply handling, battalion, were ordered to use as carriers all possible laborers found in their zones. (See Incl III, Incl 29).
Preparations for the attack were completed by the night of 17 February, preparatory artillery fires were prepared, and all last minute instructions were issued for H-Hour, designated at 0700 hours 18 February 1951.
ATTACK TO THE HAN RIVER BEND
With the 3d Battalion on the left and the 1st on the right, the 21st ROT (less the 2d Battalion, which was under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division) attacked north, jumping off at 0700 hours, 18 February following an artillery preparation.
No Communist obstructed the advance but the operation was carried out in a blinding snow storm and across rugged mountainous terrain. The 3d Battalion on the left advanced with "I" and "K" Companies abreast and "L" Company in reserve. The 1st Battalion, on the right moved out with "A" and "C" Companies abreast and "B Company in reserve. (See Incl. I, Incl. 18, Annex A).
The Regiment, attacking on phase lines, reached phase line Red" by 0800 hours . (See Inclosure I, Incl 18, Annex A). At 0830 hours Division ordered the Regiment to advance to phase line "Blue." (See Incl. III, Incl. 29 and Incl. I, Incl. 18, Annex A) Progress was so rapid that at 1215 hours Division suspended the phase line plan and ordered an advance with utmost speed to the Han River bend. Objective boundaries placed the Regiments left flank generally along Hill 395, Hill 295 and Hill 420 and the right on the Han River bend. (See Incl. III, Incl. 18) . Orders from Division at 1315 directed units to ignore the roughest terrain and use the easiest paths to reach the Han as soon as possible. (See Incl. III, Incl. 18).
By 1830 hours, 18 February the 1st Battalion was on its objective and by 2130 hours the 3d Battalion, who had farther to go and rougher terrain to cross, reached its objective. Battalions set up a defense of the Han River line in the Regimentís sector, and at dawn on 19 February patrolled in search of crossing sites. None were found. (See Incl I, Incls . 18 and 19, Annex A)
This advance increased the supply problem. The lack of roads limiting vehicular traffic. Engineers were set to work on roads, which would take 3 or 4 days to complete. Some thought was given to making an air drop. S-4 was instructed to get more Korean carriers to manhandle supplies to the troops or to arrange for boats to supply the units by hauling supplies up the Han River. More Korean Nationals, used as carriers proved to be the answer. (See Incl. III, Incl 19). Reports brought in by two KLO agents indicated the enemy had withdrawn, to the north, prior to the attack which accounted for the lack of opposition. The agents said they observed, on 17 February, many CCF troops all packed up and moving north along the route from Uhyon-ni CS642606 to Okchon-ni CS643530. One of the Chinese soldiers had stated that they were headed for Chorwon, CT4335. At 1800 hours, on 17 February, they reported, about 1,000 CCF with 300 horses were headed north from Okchon-ni. (See Incl. I, Incl. 19, Annex A).
A prisoner captured by the 1st Battalion on 19 February said he observed, on 17 February, a large number of Chinese Communist troops heading north from Hwayang-ni, CS6646 toward YangíPyong, SC670495. (See Incl. I, Incl. 19, Annex A).
This information brought about the obvious conclusion that the enemy, in the Regimentís zone, had withdrawn north of the Han River and now occupied previously prepared defensive positions there. (See Incl. I, Incl. 19, Annex A).
Lateral contact was established with the 19th Infantry Regiment on the left and the 1st Cavalry Division on the right. Battalions tied-in and consolidated positions during the day. (See Incl. III, Incl. 19).
At 1725 hours, 19 February, Division G-3 informed the 21st that it would be relieved, in position, on 20 February. Upon relief the 21st Infantry would proceed to the east bank of the Han River, vicinity CS673480, relieve the 6th Cavalry Regiment and take over responsibility for their entire zone. (See Incl. III, Incl 19). The 2d Battalion was scheduled to revert to regimental control upon completion of the move.
Plans were issued in the form of Operations Instructions #70 H21I. (See Incl. III, Incl. 29)
The 1st Battalion was ordered to assemble by 1000 hours 20 February, cross the Han in a non-tactical move and take up the positions now held by elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The move was so directed that the 1st Battalion would be on the right of the 2d Battalion, which would then revert to Regimental control. The 3d Battalion was ordered to cover by fire and observation, the 1st Battalion sector, until it was occupied by elements of the 5th Infantry Regiment. (See Incl. III, Incl. 29). The 3d Battalion, upon. relief by the elements of the 5th Infantry Regiment, was directed to assemble, move administratively east of the Han River and to Regimental reserve.
The 2d Battalion, which had advanced generally to the CS50 horizontal grid lines while under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division, was to revert to the 21st Infantry, and remain in position with its left flank near the Han south of Yangpyong.
Aggressive patrols were ordered of both battalions, on line, those of the 1st Battalion to begin as soon as it reached its position. (See Incl. III, Incl. 29).
Preparations for the move were completed by the night of 19 February, There was no enemy contact during the period 18-19 February. (See Incl. III, Incl. 18 and 19).
DEFENSE EAST OF THE HAN RIVER
The 1st Battalion moved to its new sector, completing the relief of elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment by 1300 hours 20 February. Patrols were sent out immediately. (See Incl. III, Incl. 20).
The Regimental sector now extended from the east bank of the Han River, in the vicinity of CS673480 east to the vicinity of CS749496. The 3d Battalion, in reserve, closed into its assembly area 6000 yards south of the 2d Battalion late 20 February. (Set Incl. III, Incl 20, and Incl. I, Incl. 20, Annex A). Lieutenant Colonel Perez directed Lieutenant Colonel Mudgett to reconnoiter the Regimental front and prepare counterattack plans. (See Incl. III, Incl. 20). Patrolling on 20 February brought no significant information on enemy strength, location or disposition. (See Incl. I, Incl. 20, Annex A).
An appraisal was made of the regimental frontage on 20 February and the 3d Engineers were informed amount of barbed wire needed to cover the sector. (See Incl. III, Incls . 20 and 21) .
Patrol plans were issued calling for platoon-sized patrols, using tanks where advantageous. (See Incl. II, Incl. 29). Company "B", 6th Tank Battalion closed in the Regimentís zone at 0815 hours 21 February. One platoon was attached to the 1st Battalion. The 52d Field Artillery Battalion also moved into position in direct support of the Regiment. (See Incl III, Incl 21).
The battalions during the period 20-28 February made extensive preparations for defense, using some 11,000 yards of barbed wire and setting some 300 trip flares, as well as continuing to improve emplacements. (See Incl. III, Incls. 20 through 28).
Platoon-sized patrols forward of our lines probed an estimated two battalions of enemy dug in on Hill 196 CS640518, Hill 211 CS650520 and Hill 126 CS668526, plus a minimum of one enemy battalion dug in around Hill 937 at CS701543 in order to better determine their disposition. (See Incl. I, Incl. 21, Annex A). The enemy was believed capable of adequately defending the area in which he was located, but was thought not to have sufficient force to launch an offensive at this time. Patrols during this defensive period attacked the enemy with artillery, mortar and tank fire, and directed air strikes upon enemy positions, inflicting many casualties. (See Incl I, Incls 21 through 28, Annex A).
On 23 February, a patrol engaged six enemy dug in on a knob at 05677524. The enemy used machine gun, small arms fire and hand grenades. Although enemy resistance was fanatic the patrol succeeded in killing all six in close-in fighting. At the end of the action an estimated company of enemy dug in on a hill-mass near CS671528 took the patrol under small arms and mortar fire. The patrol withdrew, called for and directed an air strike, with napalm, rockets and machine guns on the enemy position with excellent results . (See Incl. I, Incl. 23, Annex A).
On 24 February a patrol assaulted an enemy strong point on a hill near CS671528. Running short of ammunition in mid-attack, the patrol used captured hand grenades and closed on the enemy with bayonets, killing some 40 during the action, wounding 15, and taking one prisoner for questioning. The patrol captured nine Bren Guns, a 60mm Mortar and ammunition, five M-1 Rifles, 3 Carbines and a large store of small arms ammunition and hand grenades. (See Incl. I, Incl. 24, Annex A). Night security patrols reported no significant activity.
The Han River began rising the night of 21-22 February, and by morning the ford was passable only to 2 1/2 ton trucks and larger vehicles. (See Incls III and IV, Incls 22 and 23).
While engaged in extensive patrolling both defensive and withdrawal plans were being perfected. At 1200 hours, 22 February, the 21st Infantry issued Operations Instructions #71, establishing successive defensive lines east of the Han River which were to be utilized if attacked by superior forces and the regiment was forced into a retrograde movement. (See Incl. III, Incl. 29).
Three plans were formulated should a retrograde movement become necessary. Plan "A" was to go into effect, on Division order, if the present front lines were attacked by a superior forces. Under Plan "A", if put into effect, the 1st Battalion, (with one platoon of "B" Company of the 6th Tank Battalion and one platoon of the heavy mortar company attached) would move all organic vehicles to the vicinity of CS708425, break contact with the enemy and withdraw and defend on line "A", (See Incl. III, Incl. 29). The 2d Battalion (with one platoon of "B" Company, 6th Tank Battalion and one platoon of the Heavy Mortar Company attached), would move all organic vehicles to the vicinity of CS707434, cover the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion and, on order, break contact with the enemy and withdraw to and defend along line "A" . (See Incl. III, Incl. 29). Under the same plan the 3d Battalion was to be prepared to counterattack, on order, with one platoon of the Heavy Mortar Company attached. (See Incl. III, Incl. 29). The 52d Field Artillery Battalion would support the Regimental combat team during all phases The remainder of "B" Company, 6th Tank battalion, less attachments, was to move, on regimental order to the west bank of the Han.
Plan "B" would go into effect, on Division order, should Line "A" be attacked by a superior force." Under Plan "B" the 1st Battalion (plus attachments) would, on regimental order, move all non-essential organic vehicles west of the Han River, break contact, withdraw and defend on Line "C". The tank platoon would assemble in the vicinity of CS709420 to cover the ford across the Han-gang Plan "B" directed the 2d Battalion (plus attachments) on regimental order, to move its non-essential vehicles to the west of the Han-gang, to break contact, withdraw and defend on line "B". Plan "B" directed the 3d Battalion, plus attachments, to move all non-essential vehicles west of the Han River on regimental order, to occupy and defend line "B". The Medical Company would cross the Han under plan "B", as would all non-essential vehicles of Regimental Headquarters. Artillery and tanks were to follow their instructions outlined in plan "A". (See Incl. III, Incl 29).
In the event line "B" was attacked by a superior force, plan "C" would go into effect, on Division order. Plan C instructed the 1st Battalion (plus attachments) to defend on line "C" and protect the Han River crossing, withdrawing to the west bank on regimental order. The 2d Battalion (plus attachments) would defend line "B" , refusing the right flank to the enemy until the 3d Battalion had cleared, then withdraw to the west side of the Han River. The 3d Battalion (plus attachments) would withdraw through the lst Battalion, on line "C" , on regimental order and move west of the Han-gang into a new assembly area. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company would move west of the Han. The 52d field artillery and Company B, 6th Tank Battalion would carry on as ordered in plan "A". (See Incl. III, Incl. 29).
The operations instructions in general provided for an orderly withdrawal, if directed by Division, funneling the regiment across the Han river in the vicinity of Chonso-ri CS709420.
Although no attack materialized, all preparations were made to put Operations Instructions No. 70 into effect.
On occasions, the swollen Han River would have hindered an orderly withdrawal. High waters made the fords impassable most of the time, and ferries operated only sporadically until new engines for them were flown in from Japan. (See Incl. III and IV, 22 through 28).
The river barrier slowed the logistical operations of regiment to a point where an air drop was considered. A bridge opened at Yoju late in the month and eased the problem somewhat. (See Incl. III, Incls 26 through 28).
Routine relief of the 1st Battalion by the 3d was planned on 27 February and took place without incident on 28 February. (See Incl. III, Incls 27 and 28). The Regiment was ordered by Division G-3, to make a show of force by stronger patrol action on 28 February to divert activity from the 1st Cavalry Division sector on the right. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion dispatched two platoon-sized patrols and the 2d Battalion sent three platoon-sized patrols at 0815 hours, 28 February. Artillery was placed on enemy positions and the patrols made strong thrusts into enemy positions taking under fire an estimated reinforced company on Hill 937, at CS702543 and CS69 4533. (See Incl. I, Incl. 28, Annex A).
As the month ended, regimental intelligence estimated that a reinforced company of enemy was dug in on Hill 937 in the vicinity of CS701543 and that at least one battalion was dug in on the high ground north of Hill 126 in the vicinity of CS670526. (See Incl. I, Incl. 28, Annex A) .
The Regiment began the month with a strength of 158 officers and warrant officers and 2,802 enlisted men, meaning it was 21 officers and warrant officers and 612 enlisted men short of its authorized strength. The Regiment during the month received one officer and 244 enlisted replacements, and four officers and 129 enlisted men returned to duty from hospitals in Japan or Korea.
This contrasted against the Regimentís losses for the month which included two officers and 131 enlisted battle casualties and five officers and 156 enlisted non-battle casualties ; 15 officers and 80 enlisted men transferred to other organizations ; showed a not lose of sixteen (16) officers and a net gain of three (3) enlisted men.
The morale of the organization during the month was good. (See Incl. 1 through 28, Annex A).